Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

The State of Utah v. Christopher S. Kassuhn and
Lisa Marie Manzanares : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Wesley J. Howard; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc..
Brian J. Gardner; Deputy District Attorney.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Kassuhn, No. 20030813 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4572

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

:• •'•.* w U r t T OF APPEALS

BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
Kf^j
SO

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS > A 1 0
DOCKET NO 2QP&X t5~<:/\- ;
THE ST A I E OI-UTAH.

:

Plaintni/^pp... ; ,,

:

v.

:

CHRISTOPHERS. KASSUHN
ami
LISA MARIE MAN/ANAK1.S,

:

Case No. 20030771-CA

:

Case ,\„. _:/«; =.,S , -t A

Defenuan •,

•,

• .;<;s.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
\ppeal from a judgment oi conviction lor L-fin
». ;...
,K
of theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation o f * •
n. $ 7o-.>
i
amended), and Lisa Marie Manzanares on >•>"
' KS L .
ncaiu-t. in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1
.wful possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, m
I v1 i "tah Code Ann. § 58-37(a)-5
(1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court. Si.iie of Utah, the Honorable
Judith S. Atherton, Judge, presiding.
VI Si i ^ j.lk»vvARD(9005)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 Last 500 South. Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
BRiAiN J. GARDNER (8183)
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORN» %
2001 South State Street. S3700
Salt Lake City Utah 84190-1200
Attorney for Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR2 2 20M

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER S. KASSUHN
and
LISA MARIE MANZANARES,
Defendants/Appellants.

:

Case No. 20030771-CA

:

Case No. 20030813-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Christopher S. Kassuhn on the charge
of theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as
amended), and Lisa Marie Manzanares on the charges of theft, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as amended) and unlawful possession of
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37(a)-5
(1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable
Judith S. Atherton, Judge, presiding.
WESLEY J. HOWARD (9005)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
BRIAN J. GARDNER (8183)
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
2001 South State Street, S3 700
Salt Lake City Utah 84190-1200
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT

2

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT
A. OFFICER BURTON CONDUCTED A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION
OF THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THEREFORE VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

7

1. The facts of this case support a finding that police seized
Kassuhn and Manzanares in a level-two detention.

8

2. The trial court erred in finding that Officer Burton had
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants.

9

a. There was no reasonable suspicion to detain Kassuhn
and Manzanares at the inception of the stop.

10

b. Even if the initial detention is found to be lawful
Officer Burton exceeded the scope of the stop when he
asked the driver if he could search the car.

20

Page
B. THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE
UNLAWFUL DETENTION OF DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE
SUPPRESSED
CONCLUSION

23
23

Addendum: Judgments

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Crabtree v. State. 762 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491 (1983)

18, 19
20

Illinois v. Wardlow. 528 U.S. 119 (2000)

16, 19

Salt Lake City v. Ray. 2000 UT App 55, 998 P.2d 274
State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

2, 8, 9, 10, 13
16,17

State v. Baumgaertel. 762 P.2d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

15

State v. Beach. 2002 UT App 153, 47 P.3d 932

10

State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)

9

State v. Bissegger. 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178

21

State v. Carpena. 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986)

13, 14, 15, 16

State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995)
State v. Friesen. 1999 UT App 262, 988 P.2d 7
State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650

2
2, 7, 9, 20
10
9, 20

State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)

8
20

State v. Markland. 2004 UT App 1

2, 10, 12, 13, 18

iii

Page
State v. McArthur. 2000 UT App 23, 996 P.2d 555
State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)

22
8
2, 7

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)

23

State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

1,2

State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. Ct. 1988)

16

State v. Struhs. 941 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
State v. Swanigan. 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985)
State v. Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311. 14 P.3d 695
State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)
State v. Warren. 2003 UT 36, 78 P.3d 590

8
14, 15
8
9, 10, 14, 15
17, 18

State v. Wilson. 2002 WI App 165, 647 N.W.2d 467
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

18
7, 9, 22, 23

Wong Sun v. U.S.. 371 U.S. 471 (1963)

23

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37(a)-5 (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as amended)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended)

2

Utah R. App. P. 3(b)

3
iv

Page
I J.S. Const, amend IV

- .v - ' = - -3

v

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

T H h S l A i l . n l : • u,

.

:

v.:.--: '

:

CHRISTOPHER S. KASSUHN
and
I ISA \iAi\ir M.Y - \ \ . M -

:

Case No. 20030771-CA

:

Case No ?tiihuXl i 1 A •

Defendants/Appellants.

:

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
I his is an appeal from a judgment of conviction I^I
1'

irges of thei it, a class B i nisden leai IOI , ii l v icTit.-. ••-'.••

lnstophei .v K;ISM.
' -l\ ( \^U \nn -v ">--c-404

(1953 as amended), and Lisa Marie Manzanares on the charges of theft, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953 as amended) and

Code Ann. § 58-37(a)-5 (1953 as amended). Judgments are in Addendum. On
August 14, 2003, both defendants plead guilty under State v. Serv , 758 P.2d 935 (IJtah
L t. App. i l w ) , reserving their right to appeal a mnli< HI In suppress cltiiicil In IIUHIIIL t
Deri- P i mdher^ -

1

\.

,: "

^

^iv.R. 48

(Citations to the record will indicate

The transcript from the motion to suppress hearing is filed under Kassuhn's
name; therefore, there is no copy of it in the Manzanares record. However, the motion
was made on behalf of both defendants.

M.R. for the Manzanares record and K.R. for Kassuhn record.)
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The following issue is presented for review by the court: Whether the trial court
erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress where the officer detained defendants in
a level-two stop without the requisite reasonable articulable suspicion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Standard of Review: "Whether an encounter with law enforcement officers
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment... is a legal conclusion that we
review for correctness." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, p , 998 P.2d 274
(quoting State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). Likewise,
"Whether a particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a question of law,
which is reviewed for correctness." State v. Markland. 2004 UT App 1, ^2 (quoting
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996)). Also, "The legal standard for
reasonable suspicion . . . is highly fact dependent and the fact patterns are quite variable."
Chapman. 921 P.2d at 450 (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994)).
The issue is preserved on the record at M.R. 25-27, R. 20-23, 48:15.
The trial court ordered defendants' plea to be conditional on the right to appeal the
motion to suppress pursuant to Sery. 758 P.2d 935. (K.R. 49:3, 57:4)

2

i

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following constitutional provision will be determinative of the issue on
appeal: U.S. Const, amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 12, 2002, the stated charged Kassuhn with theft, a class B
misdemeanor, and Manzanares with theft and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia,
both class B misdemeanors. (M.R. 2, K.R. 2).
On August 8, 2003, the defense, representing both defendants, moved to suppress
evidence obtained in a warrantless search. (M.R. 12-202, K.R. 16-24). The Honorable
Denise P. Lindberg held a hearing on the matter and denied the motion. (K.R. 48:17).
Both defendants entered conditional Sery pleas on August 14, 2003 before the Honorable
Judith S. Atherton, pleading guilty but reserving the right to appeal the motion to
suppress evidence. (K.R. 49, 57). On September 11, 2003, both defendants filed timely
notices of appeal. (M.R. 40, K.R. 31). The cases were consolidated by this Court
pursuant to rule 3(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure on November 14, 2003.
(M.R. 55, K.R. 46).

2

The motion to suppress is repeated in the record at M.R. 21-29.
3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 18, 2002, Deputy Robert L. Burton ("Officer Burton") of the Salt Lake
County Sheriffs Department was dispatched on a call reporting a suspicious red vehicle
parked on 8600 South east of Danish Road. (K.R. 48:1). The complainant, who is not
identified, lived on the street and reported that three persons, whom she didn't recognize
as belonging in the area, got out of the vehicle and walked westbound on Danish Road
into the neighborhood on the west side. (K.R. 48:2). Just after midnight, Officer Burton
responded to the area and located the vehicle. (K.R. 48:2). He did not locate anyone
inside the vehicle or anyone standing near the vehicle. (K.R. 48:2). Then Officer Burton
"ran the registration" and found that the vehicle was registered to Tiffinny Hadden
("Hadden") who lived in the northwest part of Salt Lake County. (K.R. 48:2). Once
Officer Burton had identified the vehicle, he searched the surrounding area one more
time, seeing no one, and then drove west across Danish Road into the neighborhood
where the complainant said the individuals had walked. (K.R. 48:2-3). Officer Burton
found no one walking the neighborhood so he drove back to the vehicle and again saw
no one inside. (K.R. 48:3). As Officer Burton was leaving the area, he received another
dispatch reporting that the same complainant had called back and said that the three
individuals had returned, gotten inside the car and were lying down. (K.R. 48:3).
Officer Burton testified that as he approached the car, he "could see some people
hiding inside the car." (K.R. 48:3). He radioed for backup and drew his weapon.
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(K.R. 48:3). He ordered the occupants of the vehicle not to move. (K.R. 48:3). Then
the driver, Hadden, opened her door. (K.R. 48:4). While Officer Burton held them at
gun point, he had all the vehicle's occupants come to a seated position. (K.R. 19). After
backup arrived, Officer Burton frisked the defendants, finding no weapons of any kind,
and placed them in handcuffs. (K.R. 48:5).
Officer Burton then began to question the occupants of the car. (K.R. 48:5).
Hadden told the police that they were in the area looking for a friend's house.
(K.R. 48:5). Defendant Kassuhn told Officer Burton he wanted to talk with a friend
about moving, and they were walking in the area to find the friend's house on Creek
Road. (K.R. 19). Defendant Manzanares said "she was just along for the ride."
(K.R. 48:5). When asked why they were hiding, Hadden indicated they were hiding
because she did not have insurance on the vehicle. (K.R. 19). Kassuhn said he was
hiding because Hadden had told him to hide and because he didn't want to be accused of
anything. (K.R. 19). Manzanares said she was hiding because the others told her to hide.
(K.R. 19).
Officer Burton then asked Hadden if he could search the vehicle and she
consented. (K.R. 48:6). As Officer Burton was approaching the vehicle to search it, he
saw a bundle of mail sticking out from under the driver's seat. (K.R. 48:6). Officer
Burton bent down to look at the mail and saw that it belonged to an address in the
neighborhood where the defendants had been walking. (K.R. 48:7). Officer Burton
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asked the driver, Hadden, about the mail and she confessed that they were in the
neighborhood stealing mail. (K.R. 48:9). Defendant Kassuhn admitted that he was
present while the mail was being taken, but he didn't actually take the mail. (K.R. 48:9).
Defendant Manzanares admitted to taking mail out of one of the mailboxes. (K.R. 48:910). All three suspects were arrested. (M.R. 3, K.R. 3). A search incident to arrest
revealed drug paraphernalia in Manzanares's front coin pocket. (M.R. 3, K.R. 3).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Whether there was a seizure including a level-two detention is not at issue in this
case. What is at issue is that Officer Burton failed to identify and articulate the
reasonable suspicion necessary to physically detain the defendants.
A level-two detention is only justified if an officer has objective facts to support
reasonable suspicion that the defendants were involved in criminal activity. Officer
Burton had not observed any illegal activity before he detained the defendants at gun
point. The state argued that Officer Burton had reasonable suspicion based on the
lateness of the hour, the fact that the vehicle was not registered to a home in the
neighborhood, and the fact that the occupants of the vehicle were lying down inside.
Under the totality of the circumstances test, these facts do no rise to the level of
reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Therefore, the level-two stop was
unlawful because it was not supported by articulable reasonable suspicion.
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Alternatively, if this Court finds that Officer Burton had reasonable suspicion to
initially stop the defendants, he exceeded the scope of this detention when he asked to
search the car. Officer Burton found no evidence of wrongdoing after he had searched
each individual in the car and was therefore required to release them. Any further
investigation was unlawful. For these reasons, the trial court erred denying the motion to
suppress.
ARGUMENT
A. OFFICER BURTON CONDUCTED A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION
OF THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THEREFORE VIOLATED THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT.
The constitutional rights of Kassuhn and Manzanares against unreasonable search
and seizures were violated when Officer Burton, without any indication of criminal
activity, held them at gun point, told them not to move, removed them from the vehicle,
and handcuffed them. "The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968) (citation omitted).
To protect this fundamental right, police officers must limit their detention of individuals
to cases where "the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been,
is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (quoting
Pena, 869 P.2d at 940.
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1. The facts of this case support a finding that police seized Kassuhn and
Manzanares in a level-two detention.
The trial court did not specifically find that Officer Burton conducted a level-two
stop; however, the court's finding of reasonable suspicion assumed it was a level-two
stop, and case law supports such a conclusion. A level-two detention is one of three
types of encounters which the constitution permits between officers and citizens. State v.
Topanotes. 2000 UT App 311, %59 14 P.3d 695, 696. This Court describes the three
levels of detention as follows:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long
as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a
person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has
committed or is about to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last not longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop;" (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense as been committed or is being committed.
Id. (quoting Salt Lake City v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55, ^|8, 998 P.2d 274)). A level-one
detention is a consensual encounter with police, while a level-two encounter constitutes a
seizure. State v. Struhs, 941 P.2d 1225, 1227 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A level-one
encounter becomes a level-two stop when "a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave." Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^11
(quoting State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Circumstances
which Utah courts have held to be seizures include the display of a weapon by a police
officer, or the use of language that indicates compliance with the request is compelled.
See id (quoting State v. PatefiekL 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
8

The Defendants' encounter with police was, at the very least, a level-two
detention because they were held at gun point and ordered not to leave. (K.R. 48:3-4).
A reasonable person under the circumstances would not believe that he or she is free to
leave. Id; see also State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, f41, 63 P.3d 650; State v. Trujillo .
739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987). Kassuhn and Manzanares clearly would not have felt
free to disregard the order of the police not to move while they were inside the car.
Even more indicative that this was not a consensual encounter is the fact that defendants
were handcuffed after they were removed from the car. Officer Burton held the
defendants under gun point and then search and handcuffed them; therefore, the
encounter was a level-two detention, and Kassuhn and Manzanares were seized under the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
2. The trial court erred in finding that Officer Burton had reasonable
suspicion to detain the defendants.
Once the court has determined that a person was seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the issue becomes whether the seizure was constitutionally
permissible. "A level two stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion or it violates
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Ray, 2000 UT App 55,1J18
(quoting State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). To determine whether
a seizure is constitutionally lawful, courts first must look at "whether the officer's action
was 'justified at its inception."' Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
9). If the initial stop was justified, the court then looks at whether the detention was
9

"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first
place." Id In this case, the state failed to prove the requisite reasonable suspicion for the
initial detention and the later search.
a. There was no reasonable suspicion to detain Kassuhn and Manzanares
at the inception of the stop.
To be justified at its inception, an officer must have "an 'articulable suspicion'
that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime." Markland, 2004 UT App
1, p (quoting Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^|10). In determining whether reasonable suspicion
existed at the time of the stop, the court must look at the "totality of the circumstances"
and "determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity." IdL_, ^|4
(quoting State v. Beach. 2002 UT App 153, ^8, 47 P.3d 932). An objective basis is
determined by "specific, articulable facts which, together with rational inferences drawn
from those facts, would lead a reasonable person to conclude [the defendants] had
committed or [were] about to commit a crime." Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 88. Furthermore,
"in determining whether this objective standard has been met, the focus necessarily
centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before the stop." Ray, 2000 UT
App 55, T118 (quoting State v. Friesen. 1999 UT App 262, ^12, 988 P.2d 7).
As stated above, the seizure took place as soon as Officer Burton used a "show of
authority" to "restrict[] the liberty of a person," or at the moment Officer Burton drew his
gun and ordered the occupants of the vehicle not to move. Trujillo , 739 P.2d at 87.
Therefore, Officer Burton must have known facts before this point that would establish
10

reasonable suspicion. These facts did not come from the information received from
dispatch because the informant call only claimed that people she didn't recognize got out
of a vehicle and were walking around. (K.R. 48:2). The neighbor who called police was
describing innocent behavior. The people getting out of the car could have been lost
while looking for a friend's house, simply stopping to walk around, or any number of
completely innocent behaviors. Therefore, the facts supporting reasonable suspicion
must come from Officer Burton's own observations after he arrived at the scene.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Burton stated that he felt he had
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when he first ordered the defendants not to
move even though he had not observed any illegal activity. (K.R. 48:4). Specifically, on
cross-examination, Officer Burton testified as follows:
Q: Then, even though you didn't observe any illegal activity whatsoever
you ordered the people, the individuals in the car not to move?
A: Yes
Q: You called for backup
A: Yes
Q: And then still without any indication that there was any illegal activity
you ordered backup to come, and he appeared on the scene and he was in
another vehicle.
A: Yes
Q: You had your gun in your arm?
A: Yes

11

Q: You cuffed the individuals?
A: Yes
Q: And you frisked them?
A: Yes
Q: All without any indication of any illegal activity.
A: Suspicious activity
(K.R. 48:12).
In a case just decided by this Court, Markland, the officer similarly had no
indication that criminal activity was afoot. 2004 UT App 1,^7. In Markland, the deputy
responded to a call from dispatch at 3:00 a.m., just as Officer Burton did in this case. Id.,
^5. The dispatch stated that the caller had heard screaming near an apartment complex.
Id. When the police arrived, Markland was the only person in sight, and he was walking
down a dark street, towards a dead end, carrying two cloth bags. IdL_ The deputy then
stopped Markland, asked if had heard any screaming, and took his identification to run a
warrants check. IdL This Court found that these facts did not constitute reasonable
suspicion because the officers "did not observe, have knowledge of, or have suspicions
about any crime that had been committed or was about to be committed, let alone any
crime Defendant had committed or was about to commit." Id., ^8.
The facts of Markland are very similar to this case. First, the informant tip did not
give any information about a crime that was being committed. Second, when Officer
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Burton arrived, there was no indication that a crime was being committed by Defendants.
Instead of walking down a dark dead-end road, Kassuhn and Manzanares were lying
down in the car. (K.R. 48:12). And just as in Markland, these facts "were at least as
consistent with lawful behavior as with the commission of a crime." Markland. 2004 UT
App 1, %1 (quoting Ra^, 2000 UT App 55, ^|19).
Even though Officer Burton knew of no facts which indicated that a crime was
being committed, he claimed to have reasonable suspicion to detain the defendants in a
level-two stop because there was "suspicious activity." (K.R. 48-12). Specifically,
Officer Burton stated he had articulable suspicion "[d]ue to the fact of the time of the
hour; the vehicle didn't belong in the immediate area and that the parties that were inside
the vehicle were trying to hide themselves from view from anyone outside the vehicle."
(K.R. 48:4). The trial court found that this was a valid basis for reasonable suspicion.
(K.R. 48:16). However, the trial court erred because none of these facts support
reasonable suspicion that Defendants were involved in criminal activity, as will be
discussed below. The first two facts, lateness of the hour and the car not belonging in the
neighborhood, are directly addressed by Utah case law, which states they are not enough
to establish reasonable suspicion. See. e,g. State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (lateness
of the hour and fact that a car, which had Arizona plates, did not belong in
neighborhood, was not enough to establish reasonable suspicion). The third fact, that
Defendants were lying down in the car, does not raise reasonable suspicion by itself.
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There are three Utah cases which have held that the fact an individual is out at a
late hour does not support reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal
conduct. First, in State v. Swanigan, at approximately 1:40 a.m., an officer stopped two
people walking through a neighborhood based on a description given by another officer
who had seen two individuals walking in the area where a recent burglary had occurred.
699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). The officer did not see the two individuals commit any
illegal activity. Id. at 719. The Utah Supreme Court held the stop unconstitutional
because "the stop was based on mere hunch rather than the constitutionally mandated
'reasonable suspicion'" I d
Second, in Carpena, at 3:00 a.m., an officer patrolling a neighborhood where
recent burglaries had occurred observed a slow moving car with Arizona license plates.
714 P.2d at 675. The officer did not observe any criminal offense. Id The officer
pulled the car over and found marijuana in the trunk. Id, The Utah Supreme Court held
this was an illegal stop because the stop "was based merely on the fact that a car with
out-of-state license plates was moving slowly through a neighborhood late at night." I d
The Court said these circumstances gave the officer "no objective facts on which to base
reasonable suspicion." Id
Third, in Trujillo, at approximately 3:30 a.m., an officer observed Trujillo and two
others walking and looking into business windows on State Street. 739 P.2d at 86.
Trujillo was carrying a knapsack which the officer thought he was trying to conceal. Id,
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Without observing any criminal activity, the officer stopped the group. Id. This Court
found that the "initial decision to stop was based merely on the lateness of the hour and
the high crime area." IdL at 89. Applying Swanigan and Carpena, this Court held that
these circumstances "[did] not support a reasonable suspicion that Trujillo was involved
in criminal conduct." Id.
These cases, Carpena, Swanigan and Trujillo, "suggest that traveling in a lawful
manner at a late hour . . . is not sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is involved in criminal conduct." State v. BaumgaerteL 762 P.2d 2, 4 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). Just as in these three cases, Officer Burton did not observe any illegal
activity; yet, he felt he had reasonable suspicion, in part, due to the "time of the hour."
(K.R. 48:4). However, whether it is 1:30, 3:00, or 3:30 in the morning, this Court has
consistently held that walking or driving around a neighborhood in the middle of the
night does not give the police reasonable suspicion to conduct a level-two stop.
Similarly, Officer Burton did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendants in this
case were committing a crime because they were walking around a neighborhood just
after midnight. (K.R. 48:2).
Next, Officer Burton claimed that because he checked the license plate of the car
which belonged to the defendants and it did not belong to the neighborhood they were in,
this supported his reasonable suspicion they were involved in criminal activity.
(K.R. 48:4). The trial court agreed; however, Utah case law does not support this
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conclusion. In Carpena, the Supreme Court specifically held that a stop based "merely
on the fact that a car with out-of-state license plates is moving slowing through a
neighborhood late at night" does not establish reasonable suspicion. 714 P.2d at 675.
The facts of this case are very similar. Late at night, Officer Burton was investigating a
car which was not registered to an address in the neighborhood. (K.R. 48:2). But the
officer in Carpena had even more facts which support reasonable suspicion because the
car was in a neighborhood where many burglaries had recently occurred.3 Carpena at
675. In this case, there was no indication that a crime had recently occurred or that this
was a high-crime area.
Two other Utah cases also held that an out-of-state license plate did not give the
officer reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. In State v. Sierra, an officer
pulled over a car based on the fact it had New York plates and the driver's "suspicious
nature and the way Sierra reacted when he saw me." 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah App. Ct.
1988). This Court held that "the totality of the circumstances . . . [did] not support a
reasonable suspicion that Sierra was engaged in or about to be engaged in criminal
activity." IdL Following Sierra, this Court in State v. Baird, similarly held that an officer
did not observe facts which would support reasonable suspicion, when he observed a car
with Arizona license plates and said "something struck him funny about it." 763 P.2d

3

"The fact that the stop occurred in a "high crime area" [is] among the relevant
contextual considerations in a Terry analysis." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124
(2000).
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1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Like these cases, Officer Burton's finding that the car
Defendants were in was not registered to the neighborhood does not support a reasonable
suspicion that they were involved in criminal activity.
As shown above, Officer Burton could not establish reasonable suspicion merely
on the lateness of the hour and the fact that the car was not registered to the
neighborhood. This leaves the Court with only the fact that the parties were lying down
in the car and seemed to be "hiding" to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion
necessary to support a level-two stop. While a fact may in combination with other
indicators of crime establish reasonable suspicion, lying down in a car late at night, when
combined with the purely innocent behavior of being in a neighborhood one does not
live at a late hour, it is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion.
At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Burton stated that he made an
assumption that when he saw the defendants lying down on the floorboard of the car,
they were hiding. (K.R. 48:11). The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that a
subjective belief can be factored into the totality of the circumstances, but a detention
requiring reasonable suspicion cannot be "validated or invalidated based solely on a
subjective belief because no one factor alone is determinative of reasonableness." State
v. Warren. 2003 UT 36,1(21, 78 P.3d 590. Therefore, Officer Burton's subjective belief
that Defendants were hiding can be a factor in finding reasonable suspicion but it is not
determinative.
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Lying down in a car is not illegal. Such actions are "at least as consistent with
lawful behavior as with the commission of a crime." Markland, 2004 UT App 1, TJ7.
There could be any number of innocent reasons to be on the floor of your car. A person
could be looking for something, or trying to get an object that slipped under the seat.
While hiding in a vehicle may appear suspicious, it is not per se indicative of criminal
behavior. In fact, both defendants told Officer Burton they were hiding because the
driver told them to, not because they were evading the officer. (K.R. 19).
Lying in the car when looked at in the 'totality of circumstance5 was simply not
enough to create reasonable suspicion. Officer Burton had no indication of criminal
activity; therefore, a finding of reasonable suspicion would rely solely on the fact that the
defendants were hiding in the car. However, as stated above, "an officer's subjective
belief alone is insufficient to validate or invalidate" a level-two detention. Warren, 2003
UT 36, ^|20. For this reason, other jurisdictions which have found reasonable suspicion
in cases where the defendants were found hiding always relied on other pertinent factors
as well. See State v. Wilson, 2002 WI App 165, f3, 647 N.W.2d 467 (finding reasonable
suspicion when defendant was found hiding under a parked car because he had recently
run from a traffic stop).
For example, in Crabtree v. State, an officer received an anonymous call that a
group of people were standing by a car with a loud stereo. 762 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002). When the officer arrived at the scene, he saw a man crouching behind a
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parked car and straining to look over the edge. Id. The Indiana court found reasonable
suspicion because along with the act of apparently hiding, it was a high crime area and
the defendant had turned down his stereo when he saw the police officer. Id at 247.
Officer Burton did not have additional facts, like being in a high crime area, which
would help make these circumstances establish reasonable suspicion.
Furthermore, lying down in a car can be distinguished from running from an
officer, an evasive behavior which the U.S. Supreme Court found to create reasonable
suspicion. In Illinois v. Wardlow, the officer was assisting in a special operations
investigation in an area know for heavy narcotics trafficking. 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000).
As he approached the area, the officer saw the defendant run from the scene. Id The
Supreme Court found that fleeing combined with being present in such a high crime area
created reasonable suspicion. IdL at 126. The Court stated, n[h]eadlong flight-wherever
it occurs-is the consummate act of evasion." Id at 125. It is hard to mistake running
from police officers with any other intent but to evade the officer; therefore, the risk to
Fourth Amendment rights is minimal. However, lying in a car can have many innocent
explanations. A finding of reasonable suspicion which rests only on the fact the
defendants were lying in a car could lead to innocent people being deprived of their
constitutional rights.
Officer Burton illegally seized the defendants because there were no facts which
indicated a crime had recently occurred and he did not observe any actions which would
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give him reasonable suspicion to believe the defendants were involved in criminal
activity. The totality of circumstances, lying down in a car, late at night in a
neighborhood where one does not live, do not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion
because there was no indication that Defendants were committing a crime. Therefore,
the stop was invalid and the evidence obtained from the search should be suppressed.
b. Even if the initial detention is found to be lawful Officer Burton
exceeded the scope of the stop when he asked the driver if he could search
the car.
Assuming arguendo that this Court finds that Officer Burton did have the
necessary reasonable suspicion to justify the initial stop, the Court next must inquire
whether Officer Burton exceeded the scope of the justification for the detention. "[Ojnce
a stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last not longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (quoting Florida v.
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)). Therefore, once the purpose of the stop is completed,
the officer must allow the person to leave. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^31. "Investigative
questioning that further detains the [person] must be supported by reasonable suspicion
of more serious criminal activity." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Utah 1994).
Officer Burton testified that the defendants were behaving suspiciously because
they were hiding in the car. (K.R. 48:11). Officer Burton then pulled his gun, called for
backup, had all three people exit the vehicle, searched them, and then handcuffed them.
(K.R. 48:4-5). Officer Burton also testified that he did not observe any illegal activity.
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(K.R. 48:11). Hadden, the driver, told Officer Burton that she was hiding because she
did not have car insurance. (M.R. 28, K.R. 23). The defendants gave consistent stories.
(M.R. 28, K.R. 23). At this point, Officer Burton still could not point to any articulable
fact of illegal activity. The purpose of the stop was complete. Asking the driver if he
could search the car exceeded the scope of the detention because there was no indication
of criminal activity.
State v. Bissegger illustrates this point. 2003 UT App 256, 76 P.3d 178. In this
case, Bissegger was pulled over by police for having an expired registration. Id., ^2.
The officer smelled alcohol coming from Bissengger's breath, but saw no other signs of
impairment. Id Then the officer asked Bissegger to take a field sobriety test, which he
passed. Id The officer then asked Bissegger if he had any open containers of alcohol in
the car; he said no. Id. Then the officer asked for consent to search the car. Id. This
Court held that "Officer Wolken exceeded the scope of the detention when he requested
permission to search the car." Id, ^|20.
Similarly, Officer Burton exceeded the scope of his detention when he asked
permission to search the car. In Bissegger, the officer suspected that the driver had been
drinking. Once he administered the field sobriety test and the driver passed it, the
purpose for the initial stop was complete. In this case, Officer Burton suspected the
defendants were engaged in some kind criminal behavior but did not know exactly what.
After the officer had the defendants exit the car and questioned them and still found no

21

indication of criminal activity, the purpose of the stop was complete. Any further
detention was unlawful.
At the motion to suppress hearing, the state argued that the plain view exception
could apply because the mail was visible from the outside of the car. "A seizure is valid
under the plain view doctrine if (1) the officer is lawfully present, (2) the item is in plain
view, (3) the item is clearly incriminating." State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, f22,
996 P.2d 555. The plain view doctrine does not apply in this case for two reasons. First,
when Officer Burton first saw the mail, he was not "lawfully present" because he had
already asked for consent to search the car which exceeded the scope of the detention.
Second, seeing mail in a car with an address belonging to the neighborhood where the
car was located is not "clearly incriminating." The mail could have belonged to a friend
of the driver, and many people might put their mail under their seat to avoid losing it
while driving.
An officer's suspicions must be based on particularized, objective facts, and they
must support the defendant's involvement in criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21,
30. Officer Burton did not find any indication of criminal activity after his initial
questioning of the defendants; therefore, he should have released them. Any further
detention exceeded the scope; therefore, the defendant's respectfully ask this Court to
reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
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B. THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE UNLAWFUL
DETENTION OF DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.
The exclusionary rule acts to suppress evidence illegally obtained. "If a seizure
occurs and the police are unable to point to the specific and articulable facts that justified
that seizure, the seizure violates the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution,
and evidence obtained as a result of the illegal seizure must be excluded." State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry. 396 U.S. at 15).
Officer Burton illegally seized the defendants in this case because he did not
identify objective facts to support reasonable suspicion that Kassuhn and Manzanares
had engaged in any criminal activity. (See supra subpoints 2.a and 2.b, above.) During
this unlawful detention, Officer Burton searched the car, discovering evidence as a direct
result of the unlawful detention. Under the exclusionary rule, this evidence must be
barred from trial. See e.g. Wong Sun v. U.S.. 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963).
CONCLUSION
The officer in this case conducted an unlawful level-two detention, because he
failed to articulate reasonable suspicion that the defendants were committing or about to
commit a crime. This detention violated the constitutional rights of the defendants, and
any evidence discovered as a result thereof should be suppressed. Based on the
foregoing, the defendants respectfully request this Court to reverse the trial court order
on the motion to suppress.
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indicated above this
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ADDENDUM

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021400560 MO

CHRISTOPHER S KASSUHN,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDITH S ATHERTON
August 14, 2 0 03

PRESENT
Clerk:
vickielc
Prosecutor: GARDNER, BRIAN J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, WESLEY J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 6, 1979
Audio
Tape Number:
03-23 0
Tape Count: 7000
CHARGES
2. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2003 Guilty
The Information is read.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor,
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 45 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 41 day(s).
Credit is granted for 4 day(s) previously served.

Page 1

IS

Case No: 021400560
Date:
Aug 14, 2003
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 2

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$400.
$0.00
$183.78
$400.00
$400.00
$0
$183.78
$400.00
Plus Interest

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $150.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: SALT LAKE COUNTY TREASURER
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 021400560.
The defendant is to pay $25.00 monthly on the 15th.
The number of payments scheduled is 22.
The first payment is due on 09/15/2003 the final payment of $18.59
is due on 07/15/2005. The final payment may vary based on
interest.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s).
Defendant to serve 4 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 400.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.

Page 2

Case No: 021400560
Date:
Aug 14, 2003

PROBATION CONDITIONS
The defendant have no further violations.
The defendant to have no contact with the co-defendant in this
case.
The court will continue probation till all fines, and attorney fees
are paid in full.
Dated this

14

day of

Page 3 (last)
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SANDY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 021400561 MO

LISA MARIE MANZANARES,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDITH S ATHERTON
August 14, 2 003

PRESENT
Clerk:
vickielc
Prosecutor: GARDNER, BRIAN J
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HOWARD, WESLEY J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 18, 1983
Audio
Tape Number:
03-230
Tape Count: 2680
CHARGES
3. THEFT - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2003 Guilty
4. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/14/2003 Guilty
The Information is read.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT a Class B Misdemeanor,
the defendant is sentenced to a term of 45 day(s)
Credit is granted for 45 day(s) previously served.
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Case No: 021400561
Date:
Aug 14, 2003
SENTENCE JAIL SUSPENDED NOTE
THE COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT TO HAVE CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED AND CLOSE
CASE.
Dated this

' '»' day of

\U(,\
\

7^80(Js

i

^ ^ J U D I T H S ATSkERfON

?.%£££

Page 2 (last)
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